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ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Are appellants claims barred by the doc-
trine of collateral estoppel? 
2. Can appellant recover a real estate commis-
sion on the theory of quantum meruit? 
3. Is appellant's claim for a real estate 
commission based on an oral contract barred by §25-5-4(5). 
Utah Code Annotated, as amended. Statute of Frauds? 
STATUTES 
In the following cases every agreement 
shall be void unless such agreement, or 
some note or memorandum thereof, is in 
writing subscribed by the party to be 
charged therewith:. . . 
(5) Every agreement authorizing or 
employing an agent or broker to purchase or 
sell real estate for compensation. 
Section 25-5-4(5). Utah Code Annotated, as amended. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for breach of an oral contract for 
a real estate commission and alternatively for quantum meruit 
for services rendered in connection with the sale of the Monte 
Vista Ranch. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
On August 7, 1978. appellant filed a Complaint in 
Third District Court, alleging that he and Leland Fitzgerald 
had jointly purchased the assets of Monte Vista Ranch, Inc. 
and that he was entitled to an accounting and judgment for his 
share of the assets. The theory of the original Complaint was 
abandoned and appellant filed an Amended Complaint asking for 
a sales commission on the transaction involved herein (R. at 
154). 
The matter went to trial before a jury to determine 
whether appellant was entitled to a sales commission on the 
transaction herein. (R. at 154). The trial court's Instruc-
tion No. 8 to the jury provided in pertinent part ". . . the 
Court has ruled as a matter of law that the agreement of 
December 7, 1977 imposed upon defendant (Fitzgerald) the 
liability for the real estate commission, if any, owed plain-
tiff (appellant) upon this transaction." (R. at 155). The 
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jury returned a verdict against appellant, upon which judgment 
was entered. Appellant appealed from that judgment in Mel 
Trimble Real Estate vs. Fitzgerald. 626 P.2d 453 (Utah. 1981). 
a copy of which is attached to this brief marked Appendix A. 
As part of that appeal, appellant challenged the trial court1s 
Instruction No. 8 quoted above. This Court affirmed the 
judgment and specifically upheld Instruction No. 8. (R. at 
153-155). 
On May 14. 1982. appellant commenced this action 
seeking to recover a sales commission from the very same 
transaction involved in its prior action. The Complaint of 
appellant contained two causes of action: (1) for an oral 
contract for a real estate commission, and (2) realleging all 
of the facts of the First Cause of Action and seeking recovery 
on the theory of quantum meruit for services rendered in the 
transaction. (R. at 1-4. Appellant's brief p. 7). On April 
12. 1984. respondent filed its Motion for Summary Judgment 
based on four theories: (1) Appellant cannot recover a real 
estate commission on a theory of quantum meruit; (2) Appel-
lant's claim for a real estate commission is barred by 
§25-5-4(5) Utah Code Annotated, as amended, aka Statute of 
Frauds; (3) Appellant's claim for a commission is barred by 
the applicable statute of limitations. §78-12-25 Utah Code 
Annotated, as amended; and (4) Appellant's claim is barred by 
the doctrine of collateral estoppel. (R. at 139-151). Respon-
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dent's Motion for Summary Judgment was granted on August 31. 
1984. on the grounds that appellant's claim was barred by the 
applicable statute of limitations. (R. at 200-207). 
Appellant appealed that judgment on September 25. 
1984. (R. at 213). During the course of that appeal the re-
spective counsel for the parties discovered that the trial 
court had inadvertantly used the wrong date for commencement 
of the action in applying §78-12-25. Utah Code Annotated, as 
amended. On November 18. 1984. the parties stipulated to 
dismissal of the appeal without prejudice (R. at 227). The 
case was resubmitted to the lower court on the remaining three 
theories of respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. at 
226-229). 
DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW 
On June 17. 1985. the Court entered its judgment 
granting respondents Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. at 
260-261). Appellant brings this matter before the Court on an 
appeal of the lower court's grant of respondent's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts and circumstances from which this action 
arises as alleged in appellant's Complaint are as follows: 
Prior to December. 1977. appellant alleges Wallace 
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Ohran. as President of Monte Vista Ranch, Inc. (respondent 
herein), orally agreed to pay appellant's agent. Cal Florence, 
a 6% commission if he could find a purchsaer of the ranch on 
terms acceptable to respondent. Pursuant to said agreement. 
Cal Florence introduced Leland Fitzgerald to Ohran and through 
the efforts of Cal Florence. Leland Fitzgerald. Wallace Ohran 
and Howard Sherwood, as officers for Monte Vista Ranch. Inc.. 
entered into an Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase 
dated December 7. 1977. (R. at 2. 3 and 152). As admitted by 
appellant in its brief, the Earnest Money did not list any 
terms of any alleged real estate commission. (Appellant's 
brief p. 5). 
The only reference to any real estate commission in 
that Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase is on line 22 
which provides: "Buyer [Leland Fitzgerald] to be responsible 
for all real estate commissions." No other mention is made in 
the agreement of any obligation to pay a commission or any of 
the terms of the alleged agreement. (R. at 152). The sale 
contemplated by the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Pur-
chase was never completed and subsequent to the signing of 
that agreement, the stockholders of Monte Vista Ranch. Inc. 
entered into an agreement dated May 18. 1978 for the sale of 
their stock to Leland Fitzgerald. (R. at 3. 182-195). Re-
spondent was not a party to the Stock Sale Agreement dated May 
18. 1978 and did not receive any consideration or benefit from 
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that transaction. (R. at 182-195). The Stock Sale Agreement 
provides that none of the parties thereto has incurred any 
obligation for any real estate or other brokerage commis-
sions. (R. at 189). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The same issue is presented in this case that was 
adjudicated adversely to appellant in Mel Trimble Real Estate 
v. Fitzgerald, 626 P.2d 453 (Utah. 1981). Under the doctrine 
of collateral estoppel, appellant is barred from relitigating 
that issue. The lower court had a sufficient record before it 
to determine that the identical issue was presented in this 
case as was litigated in the prior action brought by appel-
lant. The Court may not consider any additional evidence 
offered for the first time by appellant on this appeal in its 
attempts to attack the lower court's judgment. 
Furthermore, as presented to the lower court, appel-
lant cannot recover for any services rendered in the sale of 
real estate under a theory of quantum meruit. Neither can 
appellant recover a commission on an oral contract for com-
pensation for the sale of real estate by reason of §25-5-4(5). 
Utah Code Annotated, as amended. The alleged "writings" or 
"memorandum" of any alleged agreement for the payment of a 
real estate commission are insufficient to satisfy Utah's 
Statute of Frauds. 
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Therefore. the Court should affirm the judgment 
entered by the lower court dismissing appellant's Complaint. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT IS BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF COLLATERAL 
ESTOPPEL FROM BRINGING THIS ACTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel as a form of res judicata. In Richards v. 
Hodson. 26 Utah 2d 113. 485 P.2d 1044 (1971). the Court set 
forth the distinguishing features of collateral estoppel as 
follows: 
A form of res judicata applies to situa-
tions like this wherein issues which are 
actually decided against a party in a prior 
action may be relied upon by an opponent in 
a later case as having been judicially 
established. This doctrine. known as 
collateral estoppel. differs from res 
judicata not only in the fact that all 
parties need not be the same in the two 
actions, but also in the fact that the 
estoppel applies only to issues actually 
litigated and not to those which could have 
been determined. 
26 Utah 2d at 115. 
The Court further clarified the doctrine of colla-
teral estoppel in 1978 in Searle Bros, v. Searle. 588 P.2d 689 
(Utah 1978). In Searle Bros., the Court adopted a four part 
test for application of collateral estoppel, namely: 
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(1) Was the issue decided in the prior 
adjudication identical with the one pre-
sented in the action in question? 
(2) Was there a final judgment on the 
merits? 
(3) Was the party against whom the plea is 
asserted a party or in privity with a party 
to the prior adjudication? 
(4) Was the issue in the first case com-
petently, fully, and fairly litigated? 
Searle Bros, at 691. 
See also Wilde v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 635 P.2d 417 (Utah, 
1981), and Shaer v. State, 657 P.2d 1337 (Utah, 1983). 
A. The Issue In This Action Is Identical To 
The Issue Decided In Mel Trimble Real Estate 
v. Fitzgerald 
Appellant claims that the issue involved in the 
present action differs from the issue presented in Mel Trimble 
Real Estate v. Fitzgerald in two ways: (1) in the prior 
action, appellant sought recovery of his claimed commission 
from the buyer, whereas in the present action he seeks re-
covery of the commission against the seller; and (2) respon-
dent's defense of novation was not presented in the prior case. 
The prior action brought by appellant fully adjudi-
cated the issue of whether appellant was entitled to a com-
mission on the sale of the Monte Vista Ranch. The Court in 
Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Fitzgerald set forth a complete 
summary of the factual basis from which that action arose. 
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Appellant does not dispute that this action and its prior 
action arise out of the same transaction. In the Court's 
Instruction No. 8 to the jury it stated: 
. . . the court has ruled as a matter of 
law that the agreement of December 7. 1977. 
imposed upon defendant. (Fitzgerald) the 
liability for the real estate commission, 
if any. owed plaintiffs (appellant) upon 
this transaction. 
Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Fitzgerald, at 455. 
The jury returned a verdict against the plaintiff 
(appellant herein), which verdict was affirmed on appeal. In 
light of the instruction given the jury, the jury necessarily 
must have found that appellant was not entitled to any com-
mission upon this transaction. The Court had directed a 
ruling that if the jury found that appellant was entitled to a 
commission from this transaction. Fitzgerald was liable for 
that commission. The jury determined that appellant was not 
entitled to a commission on this transaction and returned a 
verdict against appellant and in favor of Fitzgerald. 
Appellant is precluded by the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel from relitigating the issue of whether it is entitled 
to a commission on the sale of the Monte Vista Ranch. The 
fact that appellant is asserting the claim against the seller 
in this action whereas the prior suit was against the buyer 
makes no difference in light of the actual determination made 
by the jury in the prior action. 
-9-
Appellant's claim that the present action will in-
volve the issue of whether any acts of appellant constituted a 
novation of any obligation for a commission is without merit. 
The fact that respondent may have the defense of novation 
available to it in the present action which was not litigated 
in the prior action does not preclude the application of 
collateral estoppel to bar the claims of appellant. Since the 
previous litigation already determined that appellant is not 
entitled to a commission on the transaction, the Court does 
not need to reach the issue of whether respondent may have any 
additional defenses not addressed by the prior suit. 
B. The Prior Suit Was A Final Judgment On 
The Merits 
Appellant does not dispute that the prior action 
resulted in a final judgment on the merits. The action was 
tried on its merits before a jury that rendered judgment 
against appellant. Appellant appealed that verdict and the 
Court affirmed the judgment rendered against appellant. 
Therefore, the second part of the test set forth in Searle 
Bros, has been met. 
C. The Judgment In The Prior Action Is 
Being Asserted Against The Same Party That 
Was A Party To The Prior Adjudication 
In this action, respondent has asserted the prior 
judgment rendered against Mel Trimble Real Estate against the 
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very same entity; namely, appellant. Mel Trimble Real Estate. 
This action meets the third part of the Searle Bros, test. 
D. Appellant Has Made No Claim That The 
Prior Case Was Not Competently, Fully, And 
Fairly Litigated 
The final test in applying collateral estoppel is 
whether the prior action was competently, fully and fairly 
litigated. Appellant has made no claim that the prior case 
was not competently, fully and fairly litigated. The same 
counsel. Robert J. DeBry. represented appellant in both ac-
tions. The previous matter was tried in four days before a 
jury and appellant was given full opportunity to present 
witnesses on its behalf and cross-examine opposing witnesses. 
Therefore, all of the requirements for application of the 
doctrine of collateral estoppel have been met and the lower 
court properly applied the doctrine to bar appellant from 
relitigating this matter. 
E. The Lower Court Had A Sufficient Record 
Upon Which To Apply The Doctrine Of Colla-
teral Estoppel 
Appellant asserts that the lower court did not have 
the entire record of the prior proceeding which precludes it 
from applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Appellant 
cites Parrish v. Layton City Corp.. 542 P.2d 1086 (Utah. 
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1975). and Searle Bros, v. Searle. in support of its claim 
that the court must examine the entire record of the prior 
proceeding in order to apply collateral estoppel. 
Neither of the cases cited by appellant involved a 
prior action that had been appealed with an official report of 
the proceeding as in the case before the Court. In Parrish v. 
Layton City Corp.. the defendant merely asserted that a prior 
action had been filed by the plaintiff therein and judgment 
had been rendered in favor of defendant. No copy of the 
pleadings or record from the prior action was before the Court 
for it to apply the doctrine of res judicata. Without any 
evidence of the prior proceeding, the Supreme Court properly 
ruled that the lower court did not have sufficient evidence 
before it to apply the doctrine of res judicata. 
In Searle Bros, v. Searle. the Court denied applica-
tion of collateral estoppel on the grounds that there was no 
privity between the parties in the prior action and the Searle 
Brothers involved in the subsequent action. The Court, in 
dicta, went on to say that the only record of the prior pro-
ceeding before the Court were counsel's references to tran-
script of testimony from the prior action in their respective 
memoranda which was not a sufficient record to sustain a 
determination that the plaintiff's claim was barred by the 
doctrine of collateral estoppel. 
In the present action, the lower court was cited to 
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the official publication of the prior case and was furnished a 
copy of said case (R. at 153-155). The published opinion 
contains a complete discussion of the nature of the case, the 
procedural background, the relevant facts, and the rulings and 
instructions in question herein. The published opinion was a 
sufficient record upon which the Court could make a determina-
tion that appellant was collaterally estopped from asserting 
its claims herein. 
Furthermore, appellant had full opportunity to pro-
vide copies of the record from the previous proceeding pur-
suant to Rule 44(a) and (d). Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
and Rule 902 and 1005, Utah Rules of Evidence, if appellant 
felt the record contained in the published opinion was in-
complete. 
1. Appellant Cannot Now Submit 
Additional Evidence To Avoid The Lower 
Court's Judgment Of Dismissal 
Appellant has submitted and referred to evidence in 
his brief which were not before the lower court, including 
excerpts from prior briefs on appeal, pleadings from the prior 
action, minutes from the prior trial, and unsupported state-
ments about the proceedings in the prior case. It is well 
settled that evidence which was not offered in the lower court 
cannot be considered on appeal. In Pilcher v. State, 663 P.2d 
450 (Utah, 1983), the Court held: 
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Furthermore, plaintiff's reliance on docu-
ments not found in the record is improper. 
Matters not admitted in evidence before the 
trier of fact will not be considered here 
(citations omitted). 
id- at 453. 
See also Utah Dept. of Transportation v. Fuller, 603 P.2d 814 
(Utah. 1979). 
Appellant's belated attempts to submit evidence to 
attack the verdict of the jury in Mel Trimble Real Estate v. 
Fitzgerald as clearly shown in the published opinion should be 
disregarded. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT CANNOT RECOVER FOR A REAL ESTATE COMMISSION 
UNDER A THEORY OF QUANTUM MERUIT 
Even if the Court finds that Appellant's claim is not 
barred under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, appellant 
cannot recover for a real estate commission on a theory of 
quantum meruit. In respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment 
granted by the lower court, respondent presented four theories 
upon which respondent asserted appellant was barred from 
bringing this action. Appellant has only addressed one of 
those theories in its brief, namely collateral estoppel. 
In appellant's Second Cause of Action, it attempts to 
recover a real estate commission on the theory of quantum 
meruit. The Court has consistently ruled that a real estate 
agent cannot recover a commission on the theory of quantum 
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theory of quantum meruit and the First Cause of Action for a 
real estate commission arose out of the very same transaction 
and occurrence. The Court should not sanction appellant's 
attempt to subvert the laws of Utah. 
Furthermore, it is unlawful for appellant to transact 
business as a broker-dealer or agent in the sale of securities 
without being licensed in accordance with the Utah Uniform 
Securities Act and §61-1-3, Utah Code Annotated, as amended. 
Appellant did not allege or present any evidence it was a 
licensed broker-dealer or agent for the sale of securities 
even though respondent raised the issue in its Motion for 
Summary Judgment. This Court should not condone an unlawful 
act by ruling that appellant is entitled to recover on a 
theory of quantum meruit for the sale of securities. 
Even if appellant was entitled to recover under a 
theory of quantum meruit for the sale of stock, respondent 
could not be liable to appellant. The Stock Sale Agreement 
was entered into by Fitzgerald and the individual share-
holders. Monte Vista Ranch. Inc. did not sell any stock. 
Monte Vista Ranch. Inc. did not receive anything from the 
sale. Monte Vista Ranch. Inc. was not a party to the agree-
ment nor was it benefited in any way by a transfer of its 
stock between individuals. 
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signed by Ohr- a. 
I ( i t i 1 a n t offers three " w r i t; i i ><<| L • n support the r e -
o f ". (i ) \ h e E a ?: nest Money R e c e* yfi a n d > f I . "> • > "i -i * • d a t e d 
D e c e m b P r / I "I" 7 7 j | | I I * • i - m ,1 m i r, 1 a d in i M b i o n b o I W a l l a c e 
ifcl T r i m b l e R e a l E s t a t e v s . F i t z g e r a l d o f t h e 
s t e n c * I mi inn f[ ,p( i f"|ini. c o n t r a c t i n ,.i ii'.i I i»i«i .it i" commib -
oxu 1.14" | iii i l l I'm t e s t i m o n y from t h e p r i o r a c t i o n win oh 
was . irtubi ii ii diiifl h ijn in-- i l |i" auLenuauL b presicien1! i n "l in > 
A I'Mi ve r ef e r enced c a s e . 
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None of these so called "notes or memorandum" are 
sufficient to meet the requirements of §25-5-4(5). Utah Code 
Annotated, as amended. As set forth in defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, the only reference to a real estate commis-
sion in the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase of 
December 7. 1977 is at line 22 where it provides: "Buyer to be 
responsible for all real estate commission." 
The language of the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer 
to Purchase does not constitute a sufficient writing to satis-
fy the Statute of Frauds. The only effect it could possibly 
have would be on the buyer under that agreement, not the 
seller. Monte Vista Ranch. Inc. The Court has applied a very 
strict standard for writings alleged to be a sufficient memo-
randum for an agreement for payment of a real estate commis-
sion. 
In Case v. Ralph, the Court, in a very detailed 
analysis, outlined the requirements necessary to satisfy the 
Statute of Frauds for a real estate commission. The Court 
interpreted §5817. Comp. Laws Utah 1917. which is identical to 
the present statute cited above as follows: 
Under such a statute a real estate broker 
or agent cannot recover a commission for 
services rendered in either selling or 
procuring a purchaser for real property 
unless it appears: (1) that there is an 
express contract or agreement of authority 
in which the terms and conditions of his 
employment, if any, and the amount of his 
commission, etc. are stated; (2) that such 
contract be in writing; (3) that in the 
-18-
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coi i i i i i i t is ioi i H) s:>mit:h R e a l t y lY , *«o i n s u f f i c i e n 1 '" i 'i "I I i 1 h 
Statute of Frauds. 
Tlii' h..i ;• ii '.J Mt.ney A g r e e m e n t r e l i e d u p o n 1 v a p p p | l ; i n t 
c l e a r l y f a i is; f n s p e c i f y I ii • I < i iiir ' I ii n >i * < im i 
e s t a t e c o m m i s s i niii » "II .XJ.I>I. i i iu 'e ui my a l l e g e d a g r e e -
i ' i r l M1 i v H idle V J b I a K a i " I * • " l . 11. p n - I 1 a n f 
i i f . Memor ai i i l i i i i i i n i^ipn' iii i i it t-bpuiident * s 
Motioin II in i ( jHt t i ' i i (iNi'liaiit c i t e d t h e c o u r t 
t ili-'tji'il t e s t i m o n y of W a l l a c e Oh r a n , fO"»i' i | ieji<»' |«i > E 
¥1 iii ii <i' V i s i r t R a n c h iin1 i i > « ' > i • i| > >y 
a p p r 1 1 HI »11 I i i i i i i g e E a 1' I i s 111»i H , • l o < l i s <• 1 a > m f" h a l: 
W a l l a c e Ohra i i h a d a d m i t te< MI vrw* n l | I | » I«"M -i ''i1- " 
i ii t e s t i m o n y t h e r e i f i | in* i i MIJ ' n *"i t ru I ' . t . i . i ...id 
"l i i i iiu-ici i p l o i i l i e t o r me r a c t i o i • " • ' . ' e i ' r e d l 
l e g e d q u o t a t i o n f r o m s a i d " . i '" /i| . < I I. I. 1 n o t 
s u b m i t a n y i M M , ' • , I I ,, j H a n s e n |*r i n f n e v i d e n c e 
pursuant to the Utah Rules of Evidence and Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
It is axiomatic that a party cannot oppose a Motion 
for Summary Judgment by bare allegations unsupported by com-
petent, admissible evidence. Massey v. Utah Power & Light. 
609 P.2d 937 (Utah. 1980); Franklin Financial v. New Empire 
Development Co.. 659 P.2d 1040 (Utah. 1983). Without any 
evidence of any alleged in-Court admissions of the contract 
terms properly before the lower court, it could not find that 
an issue of fact existed on whether there was a sufficient 
writing to overcome the Statute of Frauds. 
In its Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to 
Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment, appellant cites 
Bentley v. Potter. 694 P.2d 617 (Utah. 1984). in support of 
the proposition that an admission at trial of an oral contract 
constitutes a waiver of the Statute of Frauds defense. But 
Bentley v. Potter requires an admission at trial of the 
"existence and all the essential terms of the contract". Id. 
at 621. 
Even if the Court considered the citations to the 
transcript of the prior action as properly before the lower 
court in order to establish an issue of fact, a reading of the 
citations made by appellant makes it clear that the testimony 
relied upon by appellant does not establish the necessary, 
essential elements of any contract alleged by appellant. 
-20-
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The testimony, when read in context, clearly demon-
strates that no contract for real estate commission was en-
tered into as was determined at the prior trial of this matter 
and upheld on appeal. The Statute of Frauds is specifically 
designed to avoid the fraud and difficulties of proof asso-
ciated with establishing the terms of any alleged oral con-
tracts. The testimony relied on by appellant does not esta-
blish the essential elements of a contract or avoid the poten-
tial fraud and uncertainty in proving the terms. 
Appellant also claims that performance under the 
alleged oral contract takes it out of the Statute of Frauds. 
In Case v. Ralph as cited above, the Court held that perform-
ance or part performance of a parol agreement for a real 
estate commission would not bring the contract outside the 
Statute of Frauds. This Court has never held that performance 
was sufficient to take an oral contract for a real estate 
commission outside the Statute of Frauds. 
Therefore, the Court should affirm the dismissal of 
appellant's Complaint as being barred by the Statute of Frauds. 
CONCLUSION 
Therefore, the Court should affirm the lower court's 
judgment on the grounds that appellant is collaterally e-
stopped from bringing this action, or alternatively, that 
appellant is barred by §25-5-4(5), Utah Code Annotated, as 
-22-
amended, from b r i n q i n q nn i ^ ' i r n •" *"o pay a 
r e a l e s l a i i
 n h i " i i »111.1 11 taiaiui r e cove r i n r s a i d commis-
s i o n On quantum HUM 111 1 . 
Uci»fc»«cttul Iv nnhiiii 1 1 '• ' 1 1 1 1 * * ! I November. 
Robert L. Jeffp 
/ / f 
CERTIFICATE Ol *'•" « I 
1
 rw " I I 1 1 * of ili*1 foregoing 
u ^ ' i 1 hand J r 1 i vei: eii \\\ \\w C l e r k .1 \\w . nirl V I ml ""min ir.iii-i 
i . . H I , S l a 1 i • i, \A p i t n I mi i 1 d i ni f 1 ' 1 .-11 I I \ I . 1I'". 11. h 4 1 1 4 , 
a n r t I t i i 1 1 npihi 1 iiiihii i il I in I In in" 1 .«ieii parties? •' , 
i|ii 1 im bant' i" 1 iiiii ' i i ieij s ta tes ma 11 »• 1 * d'<jt« i " vp.i • n > 
IJ 11 day o t November i1*!1" 'n ifbbHM ,> i> 1 iwca 
David M. Jorgensen, Ec.) 
Robert J. DeBry. Esq. 
Robert J. DeBry & Assoc - 5 
Attorneys for Appellant 
965 East 4800 South, Suite 2 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
~ ^ j -
APPEND]X A 
MEL 1RIMIJLL REAL ESI AT L \ 
Che as, Utah, 626 P 2d 451 
1 Brokers c=»88<7) 
MEL TRIMBLE REAL EST A 11 1 
i al Ho re nee, Plaintiffs iiml 
Appellants, 
\ 
bLtml A I 11/(.MIAMI IMiiubuii 
HMI Respondent. 
No 1W46. 
Supreme Court of Utah, 
Feb 13, 1981. 
Broker and sales agent brought attuni 
against purchaser for real estate sales <nm 
mission. The Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County, Bryant H Croft, J., entered 
judgment in favor of purchaser, and plain-
tiffs appealed. The Supreme Court, Har-
ding, District Judge, held that: (1) in rase 
in w hich earnest money agreement between 
vendor and purchaser provided "Buyer to 
be responsible for all real estate commis-
sions," instruction given by the court fairly 
and adequately covered the contentions of 
the parties as they wen* presented to the 
court, and there was no error in refusing to 
give requested instruction on theory thai 
broker was a third-party beneficiary in ear 
nest money agreement, and (2) issues as to 
sales commission claimed by broker and 
whether there should have been any sales 
commission at all were for the fury. 
Affirmed. 
1. Contracts <s=» 187(1) 
1L is essential for a third-party bene fi-
na l ) claimant to prove that contract was 
intended to benefit him directly; one inci-
dentally benefited by performance of a 
promise to a third person may not maintain 
an action against the promissor. 
2. Contracts <s=> 187(1) 
T< rms of agreement and facts circum-
stances that surround its making can 1M 
examined to determine whether supjHised 
third-party beneficiary of contract was in 
fact intended to IK* such. 
In action against purt baser for real 
estate sales commission in case in which 
earnest money agreement between \endor 
and purchaser provided "Buyer to be re-
sponsible for all real estate commissions," 
instruction given by the court fairly and 
adequately covered the contentions of the 
parties as they were presents! to the court, 
and there was no error in refusing to i^w 
requested instruction on theorv that broker 
was .i third-part) k'neficiary in earnest 
mone\ agreement 
i Brokers <3=>88{1) 
In action b) broker arid sales agent 
against purchaser for real estate sales com-
mission, issues as to sales commission 
c laimed by broker and whether there should 
t>e any sales commission at all were for the 
J U 1 \ 
Rolxrt J DeBry arid Dale V (Jarduu r, 
Salt Lakt City, for plaintiffs and ap|M 1-
lants 
Lawrence fcl. Lorbndge, Salt Lake ( ity, 
for defendant and respondent 
HARDINl,, Dislnel Judge 
This appeal is from an adverse judgment 
on a claim for a real estate sales commis-
sion 
Appellants w«ie HI I lie business oi selling 
real estate Mel Trimble was a licensed 
M d estate broker, and Cal Florence was 
i uiployed by Trimble as a sales agent. The 
appellants will bo referred to herein jointly 
as Florence 
The ranch property involved in this action 
is located in Cedar Valley, Utah, and was 
under the management and control of Wal 
lace Ohran Respondent Leland h Fitzgei 
aid was a rancher 
Two or three >ears prior to Decern bw 
1977, Florence allegedly obtained an oral 
listing from Ohran to sell the ranch proper-
ty The terms of the oral listing allowed 
Florence to seek offers, and if any offer 
was accepted by Ohran, a six fiercent com-
mission would be paid on the sale 
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In October, 1977, through the efforts of 
Florence, Fitzgerald became interested in a 
part of the ranch and an offer was made to 
Ohran. The offer was unacceptable to Oh-
ran. About December 1, 1977, there was a 
meeting of Ohran, Fitzgerald and Florence 
in which Ohran told Fitzgerald he would 
sell the ranch for $2,000,000, and that he 
would pay the sales commission of six per-
cent from the proceeds of the sale. During 
the course of their discussion, Ohran said 
that he would reduce the sale price of the 
ranch to $1,875,000 if Fitzgerald would pay 
the commission. Fitzgerald agreed to this 
proposal. Nothing was put in writing at 
this time. 
On December 7, 1977, Ohran, Fitzgerald, 
Florence and other interested persons met 
in American Fork, Utah, in an effort to 
effect a final sales agreement and to reduce 
it to writing. Up to this time, there had 
been no binding contract for a real estate 
listing, a sales commission, nor for the sale 
of any property. At this meeting, further 
discussions ensued. A sales commission for 
$125,000 to Florence was mentioned. Flor-
ence asked that there be two earnest money 
agreements: one for Fitzgerald's part of 
the ranch, and the other for Florence's part 
of the ranch. Ohran said there would have 
to be one entire sale. Fitzgerald and Flor-
ence retired to another room to discuss the 
matter between themselves. The testimony 
is conflicting as to what was discussed at 
this private conference. About one-half 
hour later, when they rejoined the others, 
Fitzgerald said that he would take title to 
the property and would take care of Flor-
ence. 
Thereupon, an earnest money agreement 
was made and executed between Monte 
Vista Ranch, Inc. (Ohran's principal) and 
Fitzgerald for the sale of the ranch for 
$1,875,000. The agreement had a provision 
stating, "Buyer to be responsible for all real 
estate commissions." No further particu-
lars were discussed at the meeting nor stat-
ed in the earnest money agreement with 
respect to a real estate sales commission. 
Later that evening, Fitzgerald and Flor-
ence had a discussion concerning the pur-
chase that had been made of the ranch, but 
their testimony is conflicting as to any de-
termination. However, Fitzgerald did give 
Florence a check for $5,000. Their testimo-
ny is in conflict as to what the check was 
for. 
On August 7, 1978, appellant filed a com-
plaint, alleging that he and Fitzgerald had 
jointly purchased the assets of the Monte 
Vista Ranch, Inc., that he was entitled to an 
accounting, and demanded judgment for his 
share of the assets. The theory upon which 
the original complaint was based was later 
abandoned, and an amended complaint was 
filed praying for a sales commission in mon-
ey only of $125,000. The case went to trial 
with a jury on the latter theory. A verdict 
against appellant was returned, upon which 
judgment was entered. The court denied 
appellant's motions for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict and for a new trial. 
[1,2] Appellant contends that the court 
erred in failing to give a requested instruc-
tion, No. 23, on the specific theory that he 
was a third-party beneficiary in the earnest 
money agreement between the seller and 
Fitzgerald, the buyer of the ranch property. 
In this regard, it is essential for a third-par-
ty beneficiary claimant to prove that the 
contract was intended to benefit him direct-
ly. One incidently benefited by the per-
formance of a promise to a third person 
may not maintain an action against the 
promisor. The terms of the agreement and 
the facts and circumstances that surround-
ed its making can be examined to deter-
mine whether the supposed beneficiary was 
in fact intended to be such.1 
The court gave Instruction No. 8, to 
which appellant excepted. The portions of 
this instruction relevant here are as follows: 
The controversy centers around an ear-
nest money receipt and offer to purchase 
agreement dated December 7, 1977, by 
which the corporate owner of the ranch 
agreed to sell it to defendant for the 
price stated therein. Among other 
1. Kelly v Richards, 95 Utah 560, 83 P 2d 731 
(1938). 129 A LR 164 
• tu * I ' t ah 
things, this agreement contains! a prm i-
sion that defendant, Laland [sic] A Fitz-
gerald, as buyer was \o l>e responsible for 
all real estate commissions 
. . . the court \VA> ruled as a :..*.*- « 
law that th*' aj^nvnenl of l)e<*eml>er 7. 
1977, imposed uj>on defendant the liabili-
ty for the real estate commission, if an 
owed plaintiffs U*,M • ihis transaction 
Normally, the amount of am such com-
mission would have l>een as fixed by 
agreement between the real estate sales-
man and the parties to the earnest money 
agreement and should your determination 
.from the evidence be that in this case 
such was done and agreed to at the time 
of the execution of that agreement, no 
one could unilaterally change the agree 
ment, and you should return your verdict 
accordingly; but should your determina 
tion be that while defendant agreed with 
the seller to be responsible for all real 
estate commissions at the time the agree-
ment was signed, but that at that time 
Cal Florence and Leland Fitzgerald were 
still negotiating with each other with re-
spect to the nature of the transaction as 
H -tx^een themselves and how and in what 
i • am! in wha* amount any such 
i o be paid, you are in-
i could between them-
•nakt an agreement thereon by 
«*ach would be bound irrespective 
of the intent or belief of the seller, and 
once such agreement was made, neither 
could change that agreement without the 
consent of the other. 
Thus, it is your responsibility to deter-
mine from the evidence what amount, if 
any, is owed by defendant to plaintiffs. 
The burden is upon the plaintiffs to prove 
by a preponderance of the evidence the 
basis for, and the amount of, their claim. 
[3] After reading the transcript of the 
trial proceedings, including the testimony of 
the witnesses, and considering the theories 
of the parties and the applicable law, we 
think Instruction No. 8 fairly and adequate-
ly covered the contentions of the parties as 
they were presented, to the court 'W e find 
n<i . " n - i r i ' 'Hg instruction N H, a; ' 
rtf-isuig to give appellants' req-H-ste.' 
*;! m.-tion No. 23. 
-. p K-l ants' assertion of *M > - i .... 
in^ lo <\u ei i \ M d / i -f iuh ibu against 
th< ovfenoanl is without merit, since then 
uvrr sharp conflicts in the testimony on tin 
*! ' :.e sales commission churned b\ 
* »,i.enee, or whether 'here sh 'd h,iw 
l)een a sales commission d all 
Tin- <-,v. , . ,j ^ h o u - :uit ' h* M T : t o: . i.*, 
jury *.e i i;ed on competent, relevant, and 
admissil'1* evidence, that the trial judge 
supported the verdict by us dtnia. of appel-
lants* motions for judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict and for a new trial; and 
that "M accorded to the UiganLs a fair and 
I '" -.1. without prejudicial error, 
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